Hotel Liability For Not Supplying Bath Mats—Lack of Similarity of Past Accidents Supports Summary Judgment


 

By John Armstrong

A recent case out of California’s Fourth District Court of Appeal involving Omni Hotels shows that a good investigation helps support summary judgment—even in California where such summary disposition  of cases are hard to come by.

For adjustors involved in hotel claims, however, it is the last two pages of the opinion that are of interest. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants that a hotel was not liable for premises liability or under any of the products liability theories advanced for failing to supply bath mats. The trial court however granted plaintiff a motion for new trial on whether the hotel was negligent in either not investigating further or not communicating more widely within the hotel chain the reports of bathtub accidents at Omni hotels. 

The appellate court affirmed the summary judgments, but reversed the trial court’s grant of a new trial to plaintiff based on plaintiff’s evidence of past accidents. The appellate court looked at the hotel incident reports and determined that these did not show the required “substantially similar accidents” and lacked detail about the conditions of or in the bathtubs, and lacked details about the medical conditions of the guests who were reported to have fallen in the hotel’s bathtubs. The court found the reports only provided “speculative or conjectural evidence” that Omni knew or had reason to know of a dangerous condition surrounding its hotel bathtubs.

The court also rejected the argument that hotel’s past reports of bathtub accidents necessarily put on the hotel on a “heightened duty of inquiry” to find out from the bathtub manufacturer, Kohler, if Kohler was aware of similar incidents with its bathtubs. Though the plaintiff alleged he could bring “ample” evidence that Omni had both actual and constructive knowledge that tubs in its hotels were dangerously slippery, he failed to support these claims with anything but his anecdotal witness testimony and opinions. The appellate court found this evidence insufficient to create triable issues of fact.

The lesson? Courts are looking at the foundation of expert declarations mare carefully to see if the evidence relied on is legally sufficient to support having a trial. The appellate court recognized that bathtubs are inherently slippery, meaning that for a plaintiff to impose liability against the hotel, he’d have to prove that either the hotel made dangerously more slippery or was on notice that its tubs were more slippery than other tubs—a very difficult burden. Usually, if there is a clash of expert declarations, most courts will hold a trial and let the jury decide, which is probably why the trial court granted the motion for new trial. The appellate court reversed however because it carefully examined plaintiff’s evidence and found that it was not legally or logically compelling to prove the claim that Omni knew its Kohler tubs were more slippery than other tubs—“even if” the hotel had other reported tub accidents. Implicit in the court’s decision was that it would be likely for any large hotel chain to have tub accidents since they are slippery and since the general public, including persons with a variety of medical conditions, could cause or contribute to causing tub accidents.

The moral? You can get summary judgment granted in California when the plaintiff’s expert’s opinions are based on anecdotal evidence, educated guesses, or are otherwise lacking foundation.  

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Changes to Federal Diversity Law for Liability Insurance Companies Raises Federal Jurisdictional Problems for the Insurance Bar


By John Armstrong

Congress made significant changes to the laws allowing the removal of actions filed in local state courts to be removed to federal court. Two kinds of cases have historically been allowed to proceed in federal court—even if filed and served in state courts, namely, “subject matter jurisdiction” where a federal law or policy is the gravamen of the claim and “diversity jurisdiction” where the dispute involves more than $75,000 and all of the plaintiffs and all of the defendants are residents of different states.

Congress changed what are known as the “removal statutes,” namely Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and § 1441. Section 1332 makes every corporate insurer, as a matter of law, a “citizen” of the state in which the insured resides, as well as the state of the insurer’s corporate incorporation, and where the insurer’s principal place of business. This is important because insurers can no longer bring declaratory relief actions against their insurers in federal court, and because insurers can no longer remove insurance bad faith actions to federal courts

Some states, like Louisiana,  allow a tort victim to sue the defendant’s liability insurer directly. In response to a large number of federal suits filed in the federal courts in Louisiana, Congress expanded the definition of “citizenship” for insurance companies. Liability Insurance companies are now a resident of the state in which they are incorporated, where their principal place of business [the corporation’s “nerve center” where its chief executive operations take place], and are deemed a resident of the same state that their insureds reside in if:

1) There is a “direct action” against a liability insurer; and

2) The insured is not joined as a party-defendant.

See the problem? “Direct action” is not defined. If the insured sues the insurance company directly for declaratory relief or for insurance bad faith, does this mean that the insurer can no longer remove to federal court? If the insurer cross-complains against the insured, is the insured now “joined” as a party-defendant? If an insurer sues in federal court first, can the insured move to dismiss for lack of diversity? The answer? Only time will tell. The answer will depend on how each court faced with these issues decides it.

A purely literal interpretation seems to preclude an insurer from removing the insured’s declaratory relief or insurance bad faith action since the insured is not a “party-defendant” at the time of the attempted removal, and the action would be a direct against an insurance company. Though the Congressional history shows that Congress intended to limit victims from suing insurers in federal court, the plain language in the Act does not contain such a limitation.

Oddly, if the insurer sues the insured first, the insured may not be able to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdiction, since a literal interpretation of the Act only makes a liability insurer a citizen of the same state as its insured when the insured is “not joined as a party-defendant.”

If the changes to the Act are read in view of the Congressional history, a court should interpret the Act as defeating diversity jurisdiction only in actions where state law allows a victim to sue the wrongdoer’s insurer directly, which interpretation is consistent with the text’s reference to applying where insureds are not joined as party-defendants.

It’s worth noting that changes don’t apply to property insurers, i.e., “non-liability” insurers. Or do they? What if a property policy provides a defense or indemnity for a certain kind of liability claim? Would the court look to the type of policy issued or to the insuring provision? Again, only time will tell. Now, the insurance bar is free to argue either way until we get some judicial interpretation of these new changes.

Changes to Federal Diversity Law for Liability Insurance Companies Raises Federal Jurisdictional Problems for the Insurance Bar


By John Armstrong

Congress made significant changes to the laws allowing the removal of actions filed in local state courts to be removed to federal court. Two kinds of cases have historically been allowed to proceed in federal court—even if filed and served in state courts, namely, “subject matter jurisdiction” where a federal law or policy is the gravamen of the claim and “diversity jurisdiction” where the dispute involves more than $75,000 and all of the plaintiffs and all of the defendants are residents of different states.

Congress changed what are known as the “removal statutes,” namely Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and § 1441. Section 1332 makes every corporate insurer, as a matter of law, a “citizen” of the state in which the insured resides, as well as the state of the insurer’s corporate incorporation, and where the insurer’s principal place of business. This is important because insurers can no longer bring declaratory relief actions against their insurers in federal court, and because insurers can no longer remove insurance bad faith actions to federal courts

Some states, like Louisiana,  allow a tort victim to sue the defendant’s liability insurer directly. In response to a large number of federal suits filed in the federal courts in Louisiana, Congress expanded the definition of “citizenship” for insurance companies. Liability Insurance companies are now a resident of the state in which they are incorporated, where their principal place of business [the corporation’s “nerve center” where its chief executive operations take place], and are deemed a resident of the same state that their insureds reside in if:

1) There is a “direct action” against a liability insurer; and

2) The insured is not joined as a party-defendant.

See the problem? “Direct action” is not defined. If the insured sues the insurance company directly for declaratory relief or for insurance bad faith, does this mean that the insurer can no longer remove to federal court? If the insurer cross-complains against the insured, is the insured now “joined” as a party-defendant? If an insurer sues in federal court first, can the insured move to dismiss for lack of diversity? The answer? Only time will tell. The answer will depend on how each court faced with these issues decides it.

A purely literal interpretation seems to preclude an insurer from removing the insured’s declaratory relief or insurance bad faith action since the insured is not a “party-defendant” at the time of the attempted removal, and the action would be a direct against an insurance company. Though the Congressional history shows that Congress intended to limit victims from suing insurers in federal court, the plain language in the Act does not contain such a limitation.

Oddly, if the insurer sues the insured first, the insured may not be able to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdiction, since a literal interpretation of the Act only makes a liability insurer a citizen of the same state as its insured when the insured is “not joined as a party-defendant.”

If the changes to the Act are read in view of the Congressional history, a court should interpret the Act as defeating diversity jurisdiction only in actions where state law allows a victim to sue the wrongdoer’s insurer directly, which interpretation is consistent with the text’s reference to applying where insureds are not joined as party-defendants.

It’s worth noting that changes don’t apply to property insurers, i.e., “non-liability” insurers. Or do they? What if a property policy provides a defense or indemnity for a certain kind of liability claim? Would the court look to the type of policy issued or to the insuring provision? Again, only time will tell. Now, the insurance bar is free to argue either way until we get some judicial interpretation of these new changes.